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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from an order of the district court
adjudicating the competing priority of mechanics' liens and a
trust deed on real property in Utah County.

The Utah Supreme

Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah
Constitution Article VIII, Section 3 and Utah Code Ann.
§78-2-2(3)(i).
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether the district court erred in ruling that a

mechanic's lien for architectural services does not attach until
commencement of visible, on-site improvements, despite prior
actual notice of those services?
2.

Whether the district court erred in ruling that the

mechanic's lien for architectural services did not relate back
to and take effect as of the commencement of visible on-site
improvements predating the trust deed?

CONTROLLING STATUTES
Resolution of the issues presented on appeal will be
determined by construction of the relevant sections of the Utah
mechanics' lien law, in particular U.C.A. §§38-1-3 and -5, set
out verbatim in the body of the Brief and in the Addendum.
(Add. 16.)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action by Sheldon L. Pollack Corp., et al.
("Pollack") to foreclose a mechanic's lien recorded against real

property in Utah County to secure payment for architectural
services rendered concerning the property.

Three other such

actions were filed by other mechanics1 lien claimants with
regard to the same property.

All four actions were consolidated

for purposes of discovery and trial.

(R. 155, 419, 1295.)

The

construction lender moved for partial summary judgment claiming
that its trust deed had priority over all mechanics' liens on
the property.

(R. 1283.)

The lien holders opposed the motion

and filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the priority
issue.

(R. 1454, 1537, 1549, 1772.)

The district court ruled

in favor of the lender, holding that (1) the lien for
architectural services did not attach without commencement of
visible, on-site improvements, despite the lender's prior actual
notice of those services; (2) a foreclosure judgment in a
related action barred relation back of the architectural lien to
visible, on-site improvements preceding the judgment; and (3)
there were no other on-site improvements predating the lender's
trust deed to which the architect's lien could relate.
1934-39, 1990-98; Add. 1-15.)

(R.

The district court certified its

order as final under U.R.Civ.P. 54(b) (R. 1998; Add. 15), and
Pollack filed a timely Notice of Appeal (R. 2012).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In October 1972, Wilderness Associates, the predecessor
in interest of Heritage Mountain Development Co. ("Heritage"),

Appeals filed by two other lien holders are
consolidated in Case No. 860642.
-2-

initiated the planning and development of a ski resort to be
located on three contiguous parcels of real property in Utah
County (hereinafter referred to collectively as "the
Property"):

110 acres owned in fee simple ("Fee Property"); 41

acres leased from the State of Utah ("Leased Property"); and
4500 acres of federal land under Special Use Permit from the
United States Forest Service ("Permit Property").

The master

plan for the resort called for the use and common development of
all three parcels.

(Williamson Dep. 29-39.)

Between September 1978 and the summer of 1982 Heritage
was engaged in construction of the ski resort.

Heritage

developed its resort headquarters on the Leased Property, which
improvements included an office building, sewer and water lines,
parking lots, sidewalks, etc. (R. 1147-49.)

During this same

period of time, construction access roads were cut, ski trails
were flagged and excavated, and soil tests were performed on the
Property.
17-24.)

(Williamson Dep. 43, 88, 106-08; Compton Dep.
From early 1981 to the summer of 1982, Pollack and

others rendered architectural, engineering, surveying,
consulting, or planning services regarding the overall resort
project.

(R. 2028-Exhibits, Pollack Claim Tab 1; R. 773, 1149,

1260; Williamson Dep. 137-40.)
On November 17, 1982 a mortgage lender obtained a
Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure on the Fee Property in the
separate case of First Security Bank v. Wilderness Associates,
Civil No. 54367, Fourth District Ct. of Utah County.
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(R. 1149,

1157.)

The Fee Property was subsequently sold at auction to a

third-party.

(R. 1149, 1179.)

However, following a series of

loan transactions with different lenders, Heritage reacquired
the Fee Property on June 29, 1983.

(R. 1150-51.)

Between April

and July 1983, Aztec Engineering, Inc. surveyed and staked the
boundaries of the Property under contract with Heritage.
1592-96, 1151, 773.)

(R.

Between June and September of 1983,

Pollack and others resumed work and rendered extensive
architectural, engineering, consulting, or planning services for
the Heritage development.
millions of dollars.

The value of this work runs into the

(R. 570-81, 793-800, 1152, 773-74,

2028-Exhibits.)
On September 15, 1983 Heritage obtained a predevelopment
loan of $16,900,000 from Guaranty Savings and Loan Association
("Guaranty"), an Arkansas lender.

To secure the loan, Heritage

executed a trust deed on the Property, which was recorded that
same day.

The purpose of this loan was to pay off prior trust

deed notes and to finance advancement of the project to where
Heritage could qualify for a subsequent long-term development
loan of $160 million from a different lender.

(R. 1151-52;

Williamson Dep. 73-75, 93-94.)
At the time of extending the loan, Guaranty had actual
knowledge of Pollack's architectural work performed regarding
the Property prior to the date Guaranty's September 1983 trust
deed was recorded.

In fact, most of the architectural work

performed by Pollack during the summer of 1983 was done to

-4-

assist Heritage in providing information for the loan package to
qualify for the long-term financing.

Both Guaranty and the

long-term lender had direct contact with Pollack and knew
first-hand of Pollack's architectural work prior to the
recording of Guaranty's trust deed.

(R. 1747, 1754-58;

Williamson Dep. 72-75, 147-50, 168-69.)
The long-term financing fell through; no additional
on-site construction took place, with the exception of
remodeling the headquarters office building; and the project
ground to a halt by the summer of 1984, leaving the contractors
unpaid.

(Williamson Dep. 94-96, 112; R. 1152.)

After Heritage

failed to pay for the services and improvements performed
concerning the Property, Pollack and other lien holders sued to
foreclose their mechanics1 liens.

Guaranty opposed the suits,

asserting that its trust deed of September 15, 1983 had priority
over all mechanics1 liens on the Property.

(R. 253, 346.)

The parties filed extensive memoranda supporting and opposing
cross-motions for summary judgment on the priority issue.

(R.

1249, 1454, 1549, 1630, 1772.)
The district court held that "commencement of work," for
the purpose of establishing lien priority under section 38-1-5,
requires "visible, on-site" improvements, and that liens for
architectural and engineering work, therefore, do not attach
until commencement of on-site construction.

(Add. 4-5, 14.)

The court concluded that while Pollack and the other architects
and engineers had "valid liens applying to all of the property

-5-

of the project," those liens did not attach because no
post-foreclosure on-site work was done; accordingly,

Guaranty's

September 1983 trust deed has priority even though Guaranty had
actual knowledge of the prior lienable services.
14-15.)

(Add. 5,

In addition, the court held that the November 1982

foreclosure judgment on the Fee Property barred relation back of
the architectural liens to work performed on the rest of the
Property prior to that date, and that there was no other on-site
work between the foreclosure and the trust deed to which the
architectural liens could relate back.
followed.

(Add. 5.)

This appeal

(R. 2012.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Utah mechanics1 lien law is intended and construed to
ensure payment of those who contribute labor and materials to
the improvement of real property.

Architects are, by statute,

given a lien for their services and are thus included in the
class of persons protected by the law.

The architect's lien is

valid and enforceable even though construction is never
commenced.

Pollack's lien attached at the time of commencement

to do the architectural work and has priority over Guaranty's
subsequently recorded trust deed.

Guaranty's actual notice of

Pollack's prior work satisfies any supposed constructive notice
requirement contemplated by the lien priority statute.
Alternatively, Pollack's lien for architectural services
relates back to the commencement of visible, on-site
improvements predating the 1982 foreclosure judgment, or

-6-

occurring between the time of the foreclosure and the recording
of Guaranty's September 1983 trust deed.
ARGUMENT
Point I:

POLLACK'S MECHANIC'S LIEN FOR ARCHITECTURAL WORK
ATTACHED ON THE DATE OF COMMENCEMENT OF SUCH WORK
AND HAS PRIORITY OVER THE SUBSEQUENTLY RECORDED
TRUST DEED.

The Utah mechanics' lien law is remedial in nature.

Its

aim and purpose is to protect, "at all hazards, those who
perform the labor and furnish the materials which enter into the
construction of a building or other improvement,"
enhance the value of the property.
Darke,

and thereby

Rio Grande Lumber Co. v.

50 Utah 114, 167 P. 241, 244 (1917);

v. Anderson, 652 P.2d 922, 924 (Utah 1982).

Calder Bros. Co.
The statute is

intended to prevent the owner of land from receiving the
benefits of services and improvements without paying for them.
Frehner v. Morton, 18 Utah 2d 422, 424 P.2d 446, 447 (1967).
The lien statutes are construed broadly to effectuate their
protective purpose.

AAA Fencing Co. v. Raintree Development and

Energy Co., 714 P.2d 289, 291 (Utah 1986);

Interiors

Contracting, Inc. v. Navalco, 648 P.2d 1382, 1386 (Utah 1982.)
A.

Lien For Architectural Services
Utah Code Ann. §38-1-3 expressly provides a lien for

architectural services:
Contractors, subcontractors, and all persons
performing any services . . . used in the . . .
improvement to any premises in any manner and licensed
architects and engineers and artisans who have furnished
designs, plats, plans, maps, specifications, drawings,
estimates of cost, surveys or superintendence, or who
have rendered other like professional service, or
-7-

bestowed labor, shall have a lien upon the property upon
or concerning which they have rendered service . . . for
the value of the service rendered . . . .
[Emp. added; Add. 16.]
Thus, the Legislature has determined that architectural services
benefit the property concerning which they are rendered, and
that persons rendering those services are therefore entitled to
the protection of the mechanics1 lien statute.
Construing section 38-1-3 in Zions First National Bank v.
Carlson, 23 Utah 2d 395, 464 P.2d 387 (1970), this Court held
that architects have a valid lien for their services even though
their work is not performed directly upon the property, and
"although [their] plans may not be brought to fruition by
erection of a building." 464 P.2d at 388.

That holding is

unquestionably correct because a mechanic's lien attaches to the
land as well as to the buildings that may or may not be
ultimately placed on the land.

U.C.A. §38-1-4, Add. 16;

Eccles

Lumber Co. v. Martin, 31 Utah 241, 87 P. 713, 715-16 (1906).
See also Frehner v. Morton, 18 Utah 2d 422, 424 P.2d 446 (1967)
(lien for improvement conferred by landscape architect);
Headlund v. Daniels, 50 Utah 381, 167 P. 1170 (1917).
It is undisputed that Pollack has a perfected lien for
its architectural services.

Pollack rendered its services

pursuant to a contract with Heritage, timely recorded its notice
of lien, and otherwise complied with the statutes to perfect its
lien.

(R. 1794.)

As the district court found, "the architects

and engineers do have valid lien rights for the work they have
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done."

(Add. 5.)

Thus, the only real issue is the priority of

that lien relative to Guaranty's trust deed.
B.

Priority of Lien for Architectural Services
1.

Utah Law

The attachment and priority of mechanics' liens,
including architects' liens, are governed by U.C.A. §38-1-5:
The liens herein provided for shall relate back to,
and take effect as of, the time of the commencement to do
work or furnish materials on the ground for the structure
or improvement, and shall have priority over any lien,
mortgage or other encumbrance which may have attached
subsequently to the time when the building, improvement
or structure was commenced, work begun, or first material
furnished on the ground; also over any lien, mortgage or
other encumbrance of which the lien holder had no notice
and which was unrecorded at the time the building,
structure or improvement was commenced, work begun, or
first material furnished on the ground.
[Emp. added; Add. 16.]
Section 38-1-10 places all mechanics' liens on equal footing for
purposes of priority:
The liens for work and labor done or material
furnished as provided in this chapter shall be upon an
equal footing, regardless of date of filing the notice
and claim of lien and regardless of the time of
performing such work and labor or furnishing such
material. [Emp. added; Add. 16.]
Accordingly, a mortgage or trust deed recorded after attachment
of a mechanic's lien is inferior in priority to that lien and
all other mechanics' liens filed concerning the property.

First

of Denver Mortgage Investors v. C.N. Zundel and Associates, 600
P.2d 521 (Utah

1979).

The district court construed section 38-1-5 to mean that
no mechanics' liens attach until the commencement of visible,
on-site improvements, without regard to actual notice of
-9-

off-site lienable work.

However, the effect of that

interpretation is that an architect's lien would never attach
where construction, for whatever reason, never begins, thus
rendering the architects' lien worthless.

That result is

contrary to the plain language of the statute and this Court's
holding in Zions First National Bank v. Carlson, 23 Utah 2d 395,
464 P.2d 387 (1970).
In construing the language of section 38-1-5, it must be
remembered that to accomplish the protective purpose of the
mechanics' lien law, "the phrase 'commencement to do work,' as
used in [that] statute is construed in favor of lien
claimants."
(Utah 1982).

Calder Bros. Co. v. Anderson, 652 P..2d 922, 924
Section 38-1-5 designates two principal points in

time at which mechanics' liens may attach, depending on the type
of work involved:

either at "the time of the commencement to do

work or [at the time of] furnish[ing] materials on the ground."
The district court erroneously combined this language into one
standard that postpones attachment of all liens until
"commencement of work on the ground."
the ground,"

However, the phrase "on

which appears three places in section 38-1-5,

modifies only "furnish materials" or "material furnished"; it

Section 38-1-5 subsequently adds a third possible lien
attachment point when it states that the mechanics' liens have
priority over any "other encumbrance which may have attached
subsequently to the time when [1] the building, improvement or
structure was commenced, [2] work begun, or [3] first material
furnished on the ground."

-10-

does not modify or limit the phrase "commencement to do work."
In all three places in section 38-1-5, the phrase "commencement
to do work" or "work begun" is separated from the phrase
"furnish materials on the ground" or "material furnished on the
ground" by the alternative conjunction "or."

Thus, the statute

plainly contemplates alternative times of lien attachment, and
the time of attachment of architects' liens is naturally "the
time of commencement to do [that] work."
This construction of section 38-1-5 is supported by the
holding in Zions First National Bank v. Carlson, 23 Utah 2d 395,
464 P.2d 387 (1970).

There, this Court acknowledged the fact of

alternative lien attachment points in holding that an
architect's lien attached even though no work was "commenced on
the ground."

Relying on Stanton Transportation Co. v. Davis, 9

Utah 2d 184, 341 P.2d 207 (1959), the Zions Court properly
distinguished between a lien for architectural work, "which is
not done directly upon the property," and a lien for work by
contractors or laborers that "is done upon the property."
P.2d at 388-89.

464

Because of the different types of lienable

work, the priority statute must recognize different points or
methods of lien attachment.

As the Court concluded in Zions,

where there is a priority problem with an architect's lien, the
proper recourse is "to resolve the priorities and not to
reconstruct the specific language of [the lien statutes] so as
to deprive an architect, who has rendered services concerning a
specific res, of his lien."

Ld. at 389.

-11-

Thus, while no Utah case has expressly decided when an
architect's lien attaches, the plain language of section 38-1-5
and the holding in Zions demonstrate that it attaches at the
time of commencement of the architectural work.

To conclude

otherwise would, in cases where construction is not commenced,
produce the anomaly of an unattached architect's lien.

If an

architect of an unconstructed building has a lien, as Zions
holds, that lien must have attached or it is illusory and no
lien at all.

And the only point in the statute at which it

could attach is the "commencement to do work."

Since the

district court acknowledged the undisputed fact that
architectural work was commenced prior to the recording of
Guaranty's trust deed (Add. 5 ) , Pollack's architect's lien
attached and has priority over the trust deed.
2.

Colorado Law

While the issue of when an architect's lien attaches has
not been squarely decided in Utah, the issue has been decided in
our neighboring state of Colorado under a statute similar to
Utah's.

Utah's mechanics' lien law originates from and is

patterned after the mechanics' lien statutes of Colorado.

That

fact is noted by the compilers of the 1943 Utah Code Annotated:
Origin and history of act. The Mechanic's Lien Law of
this state was taken from Colorado, together with the
construction placed thereon by the Colorado courts.
[Compilers Note to Title 52, Chapter 1, 1943 Utah Code,
Add. 17; see also notes to §§52-1-3 to -5, 1943 Utah
Code, Add. 19-21.]
It is a well-settled rule of law that when the Legislature
adopts a statute from another state, that state's judicial
-12-

construction of the statute is also presumed to be adopted and
is persuasive authority in the courts of the adopting state.
E.g., Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903,
904 (Utah 1984); State v. Johnson, 12 Utah 2d 220, 364 P.2d
1019, 1020 (1961) (Colorado decisions construing adopted
statute, before and after adoption, are persuasive).
Accordingly, absent controlling Utah law, this Court should be
guided by decisions of the Colorado courts concerning attachment
and priority of architects1 liens.
Under Colorado law, an architect's lien attaches at the
commencement of the architectural work and has priority over a
subsequently recorded trust deed.

For example, in Bankers Trust

Co. v. El Paso Pre-Cast Co., 192 Colo. 468, 560 P.2d 457 (1977),
architectural and engineering work for an apartment project was
performed for several months before the lender agreed to the
construction loan and recorded its trust deed on the property.
In fact, as in the present case, the architect's plans and
drawings were submitted to the lender to obtain the project
financing.

In the subsequent priority dispute, the lender

argued that the liens for architectural and engineering work did
not attach until the commencement of on-site construction, which
was after recording of the trust deed.

The Colorado Supreme

Court rejected that argument, holding that architectural and
engineering services constitute "commencement of work" under the
lien priority statute and that the liens for those services
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therefore had priority over the lender's subsequent trust deed.
The court reasoned:
The district court assumed without deciding, and
Bankers agreed, that "work" in the context of [the
Colorado lien priority statute] means lienable work.
Assuming the correctness of this definition, it is clear
by decisions of this court that an architect's and
engineer's preliminary work is lienable. Consequently,
[the architects and engineers] performed "work" before
November 20, 1972, the record date of Bankers' trust deed.
We have construed "commencement of the work" broadly,
in accord with the principle that mechanics' lien laws
should be construed in favor of lien claimants. Thus,
[we have] held that an architect's lien related back to
the commencement of his work upon the plans and drawings.
. . , In accord with these cases and the policy of
mechanics lien law, we hold that [the architect's and
engineers'] services here constitute "commencement of the
work upon the structure or improvement" under [the
priority statute].
As a result, the district court correctly ruled that
the interests of all lienholders were superior to
Bankers' interest under its deed of trust.
3
Id. at 460-61, citations omitted.
The earlier Colorado case of Park Lane Properties v.
Fisher, 89 Colo. 591, 5 P.2d 577, 579 (1931), also held that an
architect's lien relates back to the commencement of work upon
the plans and drawings and has priority over a subsequently
recorded trust deed. See also Weather Engineering and
Manufacturing, Inc. v. Pinon Springs Condominiums, Inc., 192
Colo. 495, 563 P.2d 346, 349 (1977)

(preliminary work of

architect, engineer or surveyor constitutes "commencement of

Bankers Trust was cited with approval by this Court in
Calder Bros., supra, 652 P.2d at 924, for the rule that
"commencement to do work" should be construed in favor of
mechanics' lien claimants.
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work" under lien priority statute);

Seracuse Lawler & Partners,

Inc. v. Copper Mountain, 654 P.2d 1328 (Colo. App.
1982) (architect entitled to lien from commencement of
preliminary work despite noncompletion of project).
The same policy and rationale for giving architects lien
priority as of commencement of their work under Colorado law
apply equally to section 38-1-5; therefore, the result should be
the same under Utah law.

In sum, Pollack's lien for

architectural services relates back to 1981 when that work
commenced, or at least to the summer of 1983 when Pollack's work
resumed, and thus has priority over Guaranty's September 1983
trust deed.
3.

Error of District Court's Notice Rationale

The district court's rationale for requiring visible "on
the ground" improvements for lien attachment was to afford
potential mortgage lenders constructive notice of possible prior
liens.

(Add. 4-5.)

However, while one of the underlying

policies of section 38-1-5 is to give notice of potential
mechanics' liens to interested parties, Calder Bros., supra, at
924 n.l, neither the language of 38-1-5 nor any case construing
that statute requires such notice as a prerequisite for
mechanics' lien attachment.

As noted above, 38-1-5 provides

that liens may attach either at the commencement of work or the
furnishing of materials on the ground.

Since 38-1-3 authorizes

liens for certain types of work not performed "on the ground,"
the only proper joint construction of the statutes is that
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certain liens may attach without visible notice to third-parties
who investigate no further than a visual inspection of the
ground.

Had the Legislature intended to require notice as a

prerequisite to lien attachment, it would have stated that liens
attach at the time notice of commencement to do work is given.
But 38-1-5 does not say that;

it says that liens attach at the

time of commencement of work, without regard to notice.
In any event, lack of notice may not be invoked to defeat
the architect's lien in this case because Guaranty had actual
knowledge of the architectural work performed by Pollack prior
to the recording of its trust deed.
168-69.)

(Williamson Dep. 147-50,

In order to obviate further discovery on the issue of

actual notice, Guaranty conceded that it had prior knowledge of
the architectural work:
Guaranty still agrees not to controvert the assertions of
Pollack concerning the commencement of its architectural
work and, as such, the evidence which Pollack states it
needs to obtain through discovery concerning the
commencement of its work and the knowledge of Guaranty
concerning the same is stipulated to . . . .
. . . Guaranty has agreed not to controvert the
assertions that it knew, or should have known, that
Pollack was performing architectural work between June
30, 1983 and September 30, 1983. [R. 1603-04.]
Guaranty subsequently reaffirmed this "unequivocal
representation" of actual notice of the prior architectural
work.

(R. 1747.)
In fact, Guaranty has acknowledged that, as a practical

matter, loans cannot be made without a formal proposal that
includes the architectural drawings and planned scope of the
project.

(R. 1267.)

Guaranty received such a proposal in this
-16-

case before agreeing to the loan.

(Williamson Dep. 168-69.)

All Guaranty had to do to ensure first lien priority was to see
that the architectural and other prior work was paid for as part
of the loan transaction.

Instead, Guaranty chose to ignore the

prior liens, accept the improvements, and then attempt to beat
the mechanics out of their money.

Thus, on these facts, the

district court clearly erred by construing 38-1-5 to require
constructive notice over actual notice.

Guaranty's actual

notice of the prior architectural work satisfies any supposed
notice requirement of 38-1-5 and renders its trust deed inferior
in priority to the architect's lien.

As noted in Tripp v.

Vaughn, 72 U.A.R. 54 (Utah App. 1987), which upheld the priority
of the lender's trust deed only for lack of notice of the prior
work:
[I]n order for a lien to relate back, notice that the
earlier work has commenced must be given to others who
may claim a lien, such as a lender.
[Id. at 56.]
Here the lender had such notice; therefore, Pollack's lien
prevails over the trust deed.
Point II;

A.

ALTERNATIVELY, POLLACK'S LIEN FOR ARCHITECTURAL
SERVICES RELATES BACK TO AND TAKES EFFECT AS OF THE
COMMENCEMENT OF VISIBLE ON-SITE IMPROVEMENTS
PREDATING THE TRUST DEED.

Pre-Foreclosure Work
As noted and documented in the Statement of Facts,

Heritage began construction on the ski resort project in
September 1978.

Between that date and the summer of 1982

Heritage cut access roads and ski trails through the Property
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and constructed its project headquarters on the Leased
Property.

The headquarters office building was designed and

constructed to fit in with the overall theme of the ski resort
and was part of the master plan for the development.
Dep. 7; Williamson Dep. 33.)

(Olsen

The district court ruled that the

foreclosure judgment of November 17, 1982 on the Fee Property
precluded relation back of mechanics1 liens to any on-site work
performed on any part of the project property to that date.
(Add. 5.)

However, the district court overstated and

misconstrued the effect of the foreclosure judgment.
To begin with, the foreclosure judgment applied only to
the Fee Property, not to the rest of the Property on which the
project headquarters, roads and trails had been constructed.
(R. 1149.)

Moreover, that judgment extinguished only those

mechanics' liens and other claims on the Fee Property that were
in existence at the time of the November 1982 entry of the
judgment.

(See Judgment 1F13, R. 1172, quoted and relied upon by

the district court.)

Thus, the foreclosure judgment does not

prevent Pollack's architect's lien from relating back to
commencement of on-site improvements on the Leased Property or
Permit Property predating the November 1982 judgment.
That point is supported by First of Denver Mortgage
Investors v. C.N. Zundel and Associates, 600 P.2d 521 (Utah
1979).

There, a contractor commenced construction on a

subdivision by installing water, sewer, and storm drain systems
before the recording of the construction lender's trust deed.
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Subsequently, that initial contractor was paid and executed a
release of all lien claims.

In the ensuing priority dispute,

the lender argued that the release rendered its trust deed
superior to all mechanics' liens.

This Court held that the

release applied only "to those rights [of the initial
contractor] accrued up to the time of the release."
527.

Id. at

Moreover, the Court held that the release did not prevent

liens of other claimants from relating back to the date of
commencement by the initial contractor:
As to the lien claimants left in the case, all their
work on the project was completed prior to the date of
Child Bros.1 [the initial contractor's] release. Their
lien rights had already attached. These lienholders were
not parties to the release, did not consent to its terms,
and are not in the category of subcontractors or
materialmen performing labor or furnishing materials at
the instance of Child Bros., and therefore the release
does not affect their status as lienholders. They are
entitled to the same priority date as that originally
accorded Child Bros. . . . . [Jd.]
See also Duckett v. Olsen, 699 P.2d 734, 737 (Utah 1985) (upheld
relation back of mechanics' liens to date of commencement by
contractor who had released claim).
Thus, even assuming that all liens on the Fee Property
for work performed prior to November 1982 were extinguished by
the foreclosure judgment, that does not prevent relation back of
Pollack's lien to those extinguished liens or to pre-foreclosure
work on other parcels.
B. Post-Foreclosure Work
Pollack's lien may also relate back to visible on-site
improvements made after the November 1982 foreclosure judgment
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but prior to the September 1983 trust deed.

Those improvements

consisted of surveying and staking the boundaries of the
property and of taking soil core samples for engineering
studies.

(R. 1149, 1151-52, 1260-61.)

The district court

erroneously ruled that these improvements do not constitute
"visible, on site commencement of work."

(Add. 4-5.)

Surveying and engineering work is lienable work under
U.C.A. §38-1-3.

Moreover, that work in this case was performed

"on the ground" and was visible.

Such work constitutes an

improvement to the Property and gives rise to a lien with
priority over a subsequently recorded trust deed.

E.g., Weather

Engineering and Manufacturing, Inc. v. Pinon Springs
Condominiums, Inc., 563 P.2d 346, 348-49 (Colo. 1977); Midland
Mortgage Co. v. Sanders England Investments, 682 P.2d 748,
749-50 (Okla. 1984).
In sum, Pollack's architect's lien may relate back to
visible, on-site improvements performed either before the
foreclosure judgment, or between the foreclosure judgment and
the recording of Guaranty's trust deed.

Thus, the district

court erred in holding Guaranty's trust deed superior to
Pollack's architect's lien.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, this Court should reverse the
district court's order of partial summary judgment on the
priority issue, enter judgment holding Pollack's architect's
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lien superior to Guaranty's trust deed, and remand the case for
further proceedings.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

OCT -6 1986

••**•••

KETCHUM, KONKEL, BARRETT, NICKEL )
& AUSTIN, dba KKBNA INCORPORATED
a Utah corp.,
)

RECEIVED

Case Number

69,472

Plaintiffs,
vs.
HERITAGE MOUNTAIN DEVELOPMENT
COMPANY, a Utah corporation,
et al,

RULING

Defendants.
KENT W. WALKER and MICHAEL V.
LEE, a Utah partnership, dba THE
ARCHITECTURAL PARTNERSHIP,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
HERITAGE MOUNTAIN DEVELOPMENT
COMPANY, et al.,
Defendants.
SHELDON L. POLLACK CORPORATION
a California corporation, et al.
Plaintiff,
vs.
HERITAGE MOUNTAIN DEVELOPMENT
COMPANY, et al.
Defendants.
********

The plaintiffs initiated this action against Heritage
Mountain and defendant Guaranty Savings & Loan Association who

i

received

a $16.9 million dollar loan from Guaranty which was

secured by deeds of trust recorded June 29, 1983 and September
15, 1983.

The lienholders consist of architects and engineers,

which include three plaintiffs, Ketchum, Konkel, Barrett, Nickel
and Austin, dba KKBNA

Incorporated; Walker

and Lee, dba The

Architectural Partnership; and Shelden Pollack Corporation.

The

defendants Langenheim Associates, Delta Geotechnical Consultants
and Forsgren-Perkins Engineering, P.A. all performed consulting,
engineering or architectural services.,
claimants

are

entities

associated

The other class of lien
with

Development, Inc., lending institutions

Heritage

Mountain

(not claiming priority

over Guaranty) or contractors who performed labor or supplied
materials

subsequent

to

recording

Guaranty's

trust

deed

in

September of 1983.
The property which has been liened consist of three
distinct parcels, (1) 40 acres of property leased from the State
of Utah where a barn has been remodeled into an office building;
(2) 110 acre of undeveloped fee property; and (3) 4500 acres of
undeveloped U.S. Forest Service permits.
The above mechanic lien claimants are claiming priority
over the trust deeds of Guaranty Savings & Loan Association.
It is to be noted that prior to this action there have
been

two other

phases

to this litigation

Mountain's and various lien claims.
1.

First

Security

Associates, Civil No. 54367.
sheriff's

sale

on December

involving

Heritage

They are as follows:

Bank

of

Utah

v.

Wilderness

This proceeding culminated in a
23, 1982, based

upon

a judgment

entered by the Honorable Allen B. Sorensen of the Fourth Judicial
District Court wherein it was decreed that:
"..•each person whose conveyance or encumberance
is unrecorded or was recorded subsequent to the
plaintiffs1 filing of the lis pendens be, and
hereby is, declared to be forever barred or
foreclosed of all right, claim, lien and equity or
other right of redemption in and to the total
property or any portion thereof."
The

sheriff's

sale

held

on

December

23,

1982

resulted

in

Paramount Life Insurance Company as the successful bidder and
there was no redemption and a sheriff's deed was later issued to
Paramount Life Insurance Company.
2. The second phase was a suit filed by Dwayne J. Sykes
v Wilderness Associates, Civil No. 62546, wherein Sykes attempted
to foreclose a mechanic's lien recorded with the county recorder
after the commencement of the First Security foreclosure action.
Sykes had not been named as a party in the first phase of the
litigation,

but

this

court

ruled

that

Sykes

claims

were

extinguished pursuant to the judgment and decree of foreclosure
in the first phase.
3.

The present proceeding is the third phase pursuant

to which the motions for summary judgment are now before the
court and the litigation involves Wilderness Associates and its
successor, Heritage Mountain Development
architects,

engineers

and

surveyors,

Company, wherein the

contractors

and

other

lending institutions all seek priority over Guaranty Savings &
Loan Association's trust deed.
The Court has considered all the memorandum filed by
parties to this lawsuit having an interest

in the matter of

priorities, and has heard oral argument from all parties desiring
to present the same to the court, and after reviewing this matter
further the court has concluded as enters the following:
RULING
The

motion

of

defendant

Guaranty

Savings

&

Loan

Association for partial summary judgment establishing the order
of priorities in this lawsuit is granted.
The court has concluded that, although a question of
^KOtBt

impression

jurisdictions
concludes

in

the

State

in the United

to

be

the

of

States, through

best

reasoned

"i^lBiraericeme^

the

majority

what

decisions

of

the court
hold

that

of establishing priority

<j^£eeof8ed"e^

Oft-site commencement of

SMBrte'tnFsrt

wch«r*ie*sr lieim*

*l*i^^$k^^^
\m&fepr?m&

Utah,

m&cMeoturml

wh<t»>:^pi^oveTftentg are t o be*

*MOWif sTiJrfrfg

ti®m&m?±&&^^matr f

'for

€H« 1piirp6a& Of

ffltn*ilLh'Sr*-t*^^^

^>i*»W^^

Establishing.
commencement

adhere t o .

This

interpretation is consistant with the language of Section 38-1-5^
U.C.A. which provides that:
" . . . liens . . . take effect as of the time of
the commencement to do work or furnish materials
WT the ground . . . and shall have priority over
. other encumbrances which . . . attached
subsequently to the time when . . . the structure
was commenced, work begun or first material
furnished on the ground, . . . "
The

reasons

generally

announced

for

the

on-site

requirement involve the commercial necessity of the financier of
the

project,

before

money

would

be

advanced

for

such

improvements,

to

be

accorded

priority

upon

recording

his

financing documents if there is no on-site indication that other
mechanic's

have expended

labor

or furnished

material

prior

to

such recording.
Without this protection, lending institutions would be
reluctant to lend money for the development of projects such as
the one in question.
It appears that certain mechanic's liens filed by those
improving

the barn on the 40 acre leased tract were performed

after the filing of the last of Guaranty's trust deeds, and would
therefore not predate the filings of Guaranty nor preempt

its

first position.
The qiarims of the architects although there work was
timmLw£tB&~tbm

~secondr pftsse ~o£ lirbiga:tion: but prior

to the f iling

oir*€t«pr»n^

since their

ip^Jtn^^

other consultants*

(tfe*Hiot^6nstitu€e ^Visible dn-site improvements".
All other claims for work done prior to the recordation
of Guaranty's trust deeds are barred by virtue of the decision in
the

first

phase

of

the

litigation

in this matter

(Civil no.

54367) and the subsequent ruling in phase 2 (Civil no. 62546).
The court notes that the msaMfcrnotom* 9n& engineers do*
WNhingsilidTien rights^ for the work they have done subject to the
priority determination as hereinabove made, «m* "that those lienaj
»P¥3»iriiiti^l^ aFFeet:^tK4f^IS^errati^ prr<3^eclr and to the extent that they
come

subsequent

to

the

phase

1

ruling

w^i^-be--'valid

afq^TxngtxriTI'br tft£ property of tire pWj£tf£.

liens4

The crosss motions for

summary

judgment

by Nordic,

Walker and Lee and all other parties hereto seeking to establish
their priority over the trust deeds of Guaranty are denied.
Counsel
Association
partial

rulin9

for

the defendant

is directed

summary

judgment

to prepare
based

Guaranty
and

appropriate

upon the above

-

and

^.

& Loan

order of
foregoing

^J?
DATED at Provo, Utah, this

1986,

Savings

&*J2U*~

day of—SJsptswfewT,

^
GEORGE E. BALLIF, JUDGE

BaKOV 18 PKfc33
LeROY S. AXLAND, Esq.
DAVID R. OLSEN, Esq.
CARL F. HUEFNER, Esq.
MICHAEL W. HOMER, Esq.
of and for
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON
Attorneys for Defendant
Guaranty Savings & Loan Association
700 Clark Learning Office Center
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480
Telephone: (801) 532-7300
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
KETCHUM, KONKEL, BARRETT,
NICKEL and AUSTIN, d/b/a
KKBNA INCORPORATED, a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
HERITAGE MOUNTAIN DEVELOPMENT
COMPANY, a Utah corporation;
and GUARANTY SAVINGS &
LOAN ASSOCIATION, an Arkansas
savings and loan association,

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT
GUARANTY SAVINGS AND
LOAN ASSOCIATION'S MOTION
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND JUDGEMENT
REGARDING PRIORITY
INTERESTS AMONG PARTIES

Defendants.
KENT W. WALKER and MICHAEL V.
LEE, d/b/a THE ARCHITECTURAL
PARTNERSHIP,
Plaintiff,

Consolidated
Civil No. 69472
Judge George E. Ballif

vs.
HERITAGE MOUNTAIN DEVELOPMENT
COMPANY, et al.,
Defendants.

EXHIBIT C

SHELDON L. POLLACK CORPORATION
a California corporation, et al.
Plaintiff,
vs.

)
)

HERITAGE MOUNTAIN DEVELOPMENT
COMPANY, et al.
Defendants.

)
)
)

On June 4, 1986, defendant, Guaranty Savings and Loan
Association, filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the
issue of the priority of claims on the relevant real property
which is the subject matter of this litigation.

On June 30,

1986, defendant Nordic Constructors, Inc. filed a cross motion
for Summary Judgment on the same issue as did plaintiff Sheldon
L. Pollock Corporation and Norbert W. Pieper, AIA, Inc. on August
27, 1986. Various memoranda were filed by the parties in support
of and in opposition to the various motions filed herein and
the court heard oral argument from all parties desiring to present
the same to the court on Tuesday, September 9, 1986 at 2:30 p.m.
After consideration of the memoranda, argument of counsel, affidavits and untraversed deposition testimony, and being fully
advised in the premises:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

That defendant Guaranty Savings and Loan Associ-

ation's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment be, and the same
hereby is granted.
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2.

That defendant Nordic Constructors, Inc.'s Motion

for Summary Judgment be, and the same hereby is denied.
3.

That plaintiff Sheldon L. Pollack Corporation

and Norbert W. Pieper, AIA, Inc.'s Motion for Partial Summary
be, and the same hereby is denied.
4.

That defendant Guaranty Savings and Loan Associ-

ation's Deed of Trust dated June 17, 1983 and recorded in the
office of the County Recorder of Utah County, Utah on September
15, 1983, as Entry No. 28168 in Book 2078, pages 40-59 securing
payment in the amount of $16.9 million dollars (herein "Deed of
Trust11) is a valid subsisting first lien upon the property described therein

(hereinafter "Property"), said Property being

situate in Utah County, Utah, more particularly described as:

Parcel #1
Beginning at a Point which is South 2233.73 feet and East
1353.38 feet from the Northeast corner of Section 6, Township 7
South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North
193.37 feet; thence West 121.53 feet; thence N 22#23'00" W 123.00
feet; thence N 20#36'47" E 501.28 feet; thence S 89°59'28" E
20.00 feet; thence S 52#28'32" E 673.06 feet; thence S 11#27'09"
E 82.42 feet; thence East 209.11 feet; thence South 686.56 feet;
thence S 89*26'09" W 69.89 feet; thence N 11°27'09" W 305.86 feet;
thence N Sl'lOMS" W 664.63 feet to the point of beginning.
Parcel #2
Beginning at a point which is South 1457.44 feet and East
1381.49 feet from the Northeast Corner of Section 6, Township 7
South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence S
82'28'18" E 297.19 feet; thence S 35#46'49" E 390.19 feet; thence
- 3 -

ll#27'09/,f E 55.58 feet; thence N 52-28'32" W 673.06 feet to the
point of beginning.
Parcel #3
Beginning at a point which is South 1812.93 feet and East
1904.26 feet from the Northeast Corner of Section 6, Township 7
South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence N
35#46'49" W 390.19 feet; thence S 82#28'18" E 230.12 feet; thence
South 286.40 feet to the point of beginning.
Parcel #4
Beginning at a point which is South 1457.44 feet and East
948,28 feet from the Northeast Corner of Section 6, Township 7
South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence N
SS'OO'OO'* E 248.48 feet; thence S 55*00'00" E 354.87 feet; thence
N 89*59'28* W 20.00 feet; thence West 413.21 feet to the point
of beginning.
parcel f?
Beginning at a point which is South 1095.69 feet and East
1309.00 feet from the Northeast Corner of Section 6, Township 7
South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence S
49*07/07" E 450.31 feet; thence S 6503O'OO" E 280.00 feet; thence
N 41#01'45" E 360.30 feet; thence South 713.45 feet; thence West
209.11 feet; thence N 11#27'09" W 138.00 feet; thence North 286.40
feet; thence N 82#28'18" W 527.31 feet; thence N 55#00'00" W
314.87 feet; thence along the arc of a 700.00 foot radius curve
to the right 260.74 feet, the chord of which bears N 45°40'15"
E 259.24 feet to the point of beginning.
Parcel #6
Beginning at a point which is South 1095.69 feet and East
13 09.00 feet from the Northeast Corner of Section 6, Township 7
South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence along
the arc of a 500.00 foot radius curve to the left 219.09 feetf
the chord of which nears N 43°47'21* E 217.34 feet; thence S
58#45'49" E 133.73 feet; thence N SS^OO'OO" E 220.00 feet; thence
East 564.44 feet; thence S 3#19'16" W 407.49 feet; thence West
100.00 feet; thence S 41#01'45" W 360.30 feet; thence N 65o30'00"
- 4 -

W 280.00 feet; thence N 49#07'07" W 450.31 feet to the point of
beginning.
Parcel #7
Beginning at a point which is South 2664.46 feet and East
35.24 feet from the North Quarter corner of Section 5, Township
7 South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence S
SS'IS'OS'9 W 530.26 feet; thence North 320.74 feet; thence S
66#59'43* E 575.11 feet; thence S 00#45'28" E 90.00 feet to the
point of beginning.
Parcel #8
Beginning at a point which is South 1234.73 feet and East
2240.76 feet from the Northeast Corner of Section 6, Township 7
South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence N
73#04'51'r E 428.70 feet; thence S 00M5'28" E 1429.67 feet; thence
N 66#54'43" W 575.11 feet; thence North 562.81 feet; thence East
425.00 feet; thence North 125.00 feet; thence West 425.00 feet;
thence North 197.50 feet; thence East 425.00 feet; thence North
125.00 feet; thence West 425.00 feet; thence North 68.95 feet;
thence East 100.00 feet to the point of beginning.
Parcel #9
Beginning at a point which is South 1234.73 feet and East
2240.76 feet from the Northeast Corner of Section 6, Township 7
South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence N
3#19'16" E 407.49 feet; thence East 75.56 feet; thence N 58°17'49"
E 358.21 feet; thence S 00#45'28" E 470.33 feet; thence S
73 # 04 / 51" W 428.70 feet to the point of beginning.
Parcel "D"

Commencing at a point located South 2233.72 feet and East
1353.37 feet from the Northwest Corner of Section 5, Township 7
South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence South
81#10'45" East 664.64 feet; thence South 11#27'09" East 300.00
feet; thence South 89*10'45* West along a fence line 596.98 feet;
thence South 87*52'55* West along a fence line 93.49 feet; thence
North 58'17' West along a fence line 15.65 feet; thence South
88•45'30" West along a fence line 12.69 feet; thence north 400.00
feet to the point of beginning.
- 5 -

Parcel "F"
Commencing at a point located South 1457.43 feet and East
955.78 feet from the Northwest Corner of Section 5, Township 7
South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence East
405.70 feet; thence South 20#36'47" West 197.28 feet; thence
South 78•34'15" West 300.90 feet; thence North 09'36' West along
the Easterly bank of the Upper East Union Canal 247.74 feet to
the point of beginning.

Paramount Lit? Parcel
Beginning at a point which is North 114.11 feet and East
388.71 feet from the East Quarter Corner of Section 6, Township
7 South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence along
the arc of an 893.64 foot radius curve to the right 449.70 feet,
the chord of which bears North 20•35'02" East 444.97 feet; thence
North 35*00'00" East 556.99 feet; thence South 43*30'00" East
436.93 feet; thence South 670.00 feet; thence East 154.39 feet;
thence North 24.92 feet, thence North 88*45'30" East 12.69 feet;
thence South 58•17'00" East 15.65 feet; thence North 89•16'50*
East 672.01 feet; thence South 10*02'24" East 402.68 feet; thence
South 21*26'15" East 442.45 feet; thence South 10#29'00" West
603.46 feet; thence North 89#17'00" West 575.53 feet; thence North
4#26'00" West 130.08 feet; thence North 6'12'30" West 242.43 feet;
thence North 8•43'30* East 232.11 feet; thence North 33*34'00"
East 50.89 feet; thence North 89•30'30" West 505.62 feet; thence
South 0#08'00" East 43.42 feet; thence North 89°31'36" West 546.46
feet; thence North 42*55'46" West 75.43 feet; thence along the
arc of a 15 foot radius curve to the right 23.56 feet, the chord
of which bears North 2*04'20" East 21.21 feet; thence North
47#04'14" East 10.00 feet; thence North 42#55'46" West 80.00
feet; thence along the arc of a 15 foot radius curve to the right
23.56 feet, the chord of which bears North 87°55'40" West 21.21
feet; thence North 42*55'46" West 32.00 feet; thence along the
arc of a 222.73 foot radius curve to the right 190.86 feet, the
chord of which bears North 18•22'52" West 185.07 feet; thence
North 6*10'03" East 518.03 feet to the point of beginning.
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LEASED LANDS
U.S. Forest Service:
The Heritige Mountain resort area within Sections 22, 23, 24,
25, 26, 27, 33, 34, 35, 36, T. 6 S., R. 3 E. and Sections 1, 2,
3, 4, 5, T. 7 S., R. 3 E., Salt Lake Base and Meridian as delineated on the permit area map.
The Heritage Mountain resort area with Sections 22, 23, 24, 25,
26, 27, 33, 34, 35, 36, T. 6 S., R. 3 E. and Sections 1, 2, 3,
4, 5, T. 7 S., R. 3 E., which is attached and made a part of
the permit.
City of Provo, Utah:
TRACT 1:
Beginning at a point on a fence line on the South line of
300 North Street in Provo, Utah, East 80.62 feet and South 738.84
feet from the West quarter corner of Section 5, Township 7 South,
Range 3 East, of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and running
thence South 89#31'36" East along a fence line on said South
line of 300 North Street, 998.04 feet; thence North 0*08' West
along a fence line projected 43.42 feet to the North line of
300 North Street projected; thence South 89•30/30" East along
the North line of 300 North Street projected 505.62 feet to the
West bank of the Upper East Union Canal; thence southerly along
the westerly bank of said canal on the following courses and
distances: South 33*34' West 50.89 feet; thence South 8-43'30"
West 232.11 feet; thence South 6*12'30" East 242.33 feet; thence
South 4*26' East 130.08 feet to the North line of 150 North Street
projected; thence leaving the said bank of said canal and running
North 89*17' West along the line of the Street projected 144.05
feet; thence North 1*27'30* East 97.88 feet; thence North
89#15'39" West 231.01 feet; thence South 81#51'06" West 372.80
feet; thence South 0*49'12" West 40.51 feet; thence North 89#17'
West 739.91 feet; thence South 0o32'20" West 61.87 feet; thence
North 89"22'20" West 621.21 feet; thence North 0*20'20" East along
a fence line 654.96 feet; thence South 89*22'20" East along a
fence line of the South line of 300 North Street a distance of
623.50 feet, to the point of beginning.
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TRACT NO, 2:
Beginning at a point which is South 1872.32 feet and East
69.75 feet from the East quarter corner of Section 6, Township
7 South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and running
thence North 88•15'46" West 922.76 feet; thence along the arc
of a 297.89 foot radius curve to the right 295.20 feet, the chord
of which bears North 31*27'37* East 283.27 feet; thence North
59#51' East 425.03 feet; thence South 89"22'20'r East 411.47 feet;
thence South 0*32'20* West 478.59 feet to the point of beginning.
5.

Defendant Guaranty Savings and Loan Association's

right, title, claim, lien and interest in and to the Property
is hereby adjudged to be prior and superior both in time and as
of right of the title, claims, liens and interests of all named
parties, and each and all of them, and of all other persons or
entities claiming any right to the title, claim, lien or interest
in and to the Property and the whole thereof.
6.

That the rights, title, claims, liens and interest

of all named parties in and to the Property are hereby adjudged
to be subsequent, junior, subordinate and inferior to the lien
and claim of defendant Guaranty Savings and Loan Association in
and to the Property.
7.

That the a^sMSfcC*^

^•BWMT'^tt^^

*com-,

8.

That the smti^Mimvwta£^mtA engineering worX;*pmr~i

8

-

*Tur!M&"^tt^Tmspmcte^txfr

thm-Property constitutes a lien on the

property-as provided in Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-3;
9.

This Court expressly finds that there is no just

reason for delaying the entry of a Final Judgment on the issue
of the priority of interests among the various parties in this
action in and to the Property.

Accordingly, this Court hereby

expressly directs the entry of this Final Judgment against all
parties on the issue of Guaranty Savings and Loan Association's
prior interest in and to the Property and an appeal herefrom
may be taken pursuant to Rule 54 (b) , Utah Rules of Civil Procedure .
10.

The defendant Guaranty Savings and Loan Associ-

ation is awarded its costs of court herein expended.
DATED this / jT day of November, 1986.
BY Tip; COURT:
GEORGE 1^/BALLIF

D i s t r i c t Court Judge
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38-1-3. Those entitled to lien — What may be attached.
Contractors, subcontractors, and all persons performing any services or furnishing or renting any materials or equipment used in the construction, alteration, or improvement of any building or structure or improvement to any
premises in any manner and licensed architects and engineers and artisans
who have furnished designs, plats, plans, maps, specifications, drawings, estimates of cost, surveys or superintendence, or who have rendered other like
professional service, or bestowed labor, shall have a lien upon the property
upon or concerning which they have rendered service, performed labor, or
furnished or rented materials or equipment for the value of the service rendered, labor performed, or materials or equipment furnished or rented by tv.ch
respectively, whether at the instance of the owner or of any other person
acting by his authority as agent, contractor, or otherwise. This lien shall
attach only to such interest as the owner may have in the p r o p e m .

38-1-4. Amount of land affected — Lots and subdivisions
— Franchises, fixtures, and appurtenances.
The liens granted by this chapter shall extend to and cover so much of the
land whereon such building, structure, or improvement shall be made as may
be necessary for convenient use and occupation of the land. In case any such
building shall occupy two or more lots or other subdivisions of land, such lots
or subdivisions shall be considered as one for the purposes of this chapter The
hens provided for in this chapter shall attach to all franchises, privileges,
appurtenances, and to all machinery and fixtures, pertaining to or used m
connection with any such lands, buildings, structures, or improvements

38-1-5. Priority—Over other encumbrances.—The liens herein provided
for shall relate back to, and take effect as of, the time of the commencement to do work or furnish materials on the ground for the structure or improvement, and shall have priority over any lien, mortgage or other encumbrance which may have attached subsequently to the time when the
building, improvement or structure was commenced, work begun, or first
material furnished on the ground; also over any lien, mortgage or other
encumbrance of which the her holder had no notice and which was unrecorded at the time the building, structure or improvement was commenced, work begun, or first material furnished on the ground.

38-1-10. Laborers' and materialmen's lien on equal footing regardless
of time of filing.—The liens for work and labor done or material furnished
as provided in this chapter shall be upon an equal footing, regardless of
date of filing the notice and claim of lien and regardless of the time of
performing such work and labor or furnishing such materialHistory: Code Report; R. S. 1933 & C.
1943, 52-1-10.

ft
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TITLE 52
LIENS
Chapter
Chapter
Chapter
Chapter
Chapter
Chapter

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

MECHANICS' LIENS.
MISCELLANEOUS LIENS.
LESSORS' LIENS.
COMMON CARRIERS' LIENS.
JUDGMENT LIEN—U. S. COURTS.
FEDERAL TAX LIENS.

CHAPTER I
MECHANICS' LIENS*
52-1-1,

Public Buildings N o t Subject
to.
52-1-2.
Contractors and Subcontract o r s Defined.
52-1-::.
Who Entitled—Attaches
to
O w n e r ' s I n t e r e s t — L i e n on
Ores Mined.
"2 1-4.
A m o u n t of Land Affected—
Lots
and
Subdivisions—
Mines — F r a n c h i s e s , F i x t u r e s and A p p u r t e n a n c e s .
."2-1-5.
Priority—Over
Other
Encumbrances.
52-1-G.
Id. Over Claims of C r e d i t o r s
of Original C o n t r a c t o r or
Subcontractor.
52-1-7.
Notice of C l a i m — C o n t e n t s —
Recording.
"2-1 8.
Id. I n c l u d i n g Liens on Several
Properties
i n One
,
Claim.
52 1-1).
Id. Notice I m p a r t e d by Record.
52 1-10. L a b o r e r s ' a n d M a t e r i a l m e n ' s
Lien on E q u a l F o o t i n g Reg a r d l e s s of Time of F i l i n g .
52-1-11. Enforcement—Time
for—Lis
Pendens—Action for Debt
Not Affected.

52-1-12.
52-1-1:5.
52-1-14.
52-1-15.
52-1-1(5.
52-1-17.
52-1-IS.
52-1-11).
52-1-20.
52-1-21.
52-1-22.
52-1-2:!.
52-1-24.
52-1-25.
52-l-2f>.

Id. Notice to O t h e r Claimants—Waiver.
Id.
Parties—Joinder—Intervention.
Id. D e c r e e — O r d e r of S a t i s faction.
Id. Sale—Redemption —-Disposition of Proceeds.
Id. Deficiency J u d g m e n t .
Id. Costs.
Id. A t t o r n e y s ' F e e s .
P a y m e n t by O w n e r to Contractor — Subcontractor's
Lien N o t Affected.
U\. When C o n t r a c t Price Not
P a y a b l e in C a s h — N o t i c e .
Id. Advance
Payments—Effect
on
Subcontractor's
Lien.
Id.
Creditors C a n n o t Reach Materials Furnished, Except
for P u r c h a s e P r i c e .
Cancellation of R e c o r d — P e n alty.
Abuse of Lien R i g h t — P e n a l t y .
A s s i g n m e n t of Lien.

Origin and history of a c t . T h e Mechanic's Lien Law of this s t a t e w a s t a k e n
from Colorado, t o g e t h e r with t h e construction placed thereon by t h e Colorado c o u r t s .
Validity. T h e U t a h Mechanic's Lien Law is not made in p u r s u a n c e of a n y e x p r e s s
requirement of t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n ; but t h e law m a y , nevertheless, be constitutional
;
<r;'i!S( tin- < \»Mstitu1 ion d. x-s not prohibit it. Uio (irandc Lumber Co. v. D a r k e ,
•"" I . 111. 121. 107 I M M l , L. R. A. R H S A 11!>:;.
f'ur|i«;>e a ad object of law. T h e aim and purpose of o u r Mechanic's Lien Law
manifefMy lias been to protect, a t all h a z a r d s , those who perform the labor and
furnish t h e m a t e r i a l s which e n t e r into t h e construction of a huildimr or otherimprovement. T h e owner of t h e premises is most likely to suffer.
Rio G r a n d e
Lumber Co. v. D a r k e . 50 U . ' I M , 122, 107 I \ 241. L. R. A. 11)18 A 11SKJ.

[53.1]
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Nature and perfection of lien. Mechanic's lien is purely statutory, not contractual,
and none can be acquired unless claiman has complied with provisions of statut*
creating lien. Eccles Lumber Co. v. Martin, 31 U. 241, 87 P. 713.
General construction. This whole act must be cons-trued together and, if possible
effect be jriven to every part of it. The real intention of the legislature in enacting
this law cannot be ascertained by a consideration of the several sections separately.
Morrison v. Carey-Lombard Co.. i> U. 70, 7!», 33 P. 238; Eccles Lumber Co. v. Martin'
31 U. 241, 87 P. 713.
'
"*

52-1-1. Public Buildings Not Subject to.
The provisions of this chapter shall not apply to any public building,
structure or improvement.
(C. L. 17, § 3751.)
History.
This section is identical with last sentence of R. S. 1898, § 1399; Comp. Laws
1907, § 1399.
Cross-references.
Contractors' bonds on public contracts,
17-1.
1.

Operation and effect of section.
Although a workman or materialman
cannot acquire a lien on a public building for labor or material furnished fh
the construction of such building, he may
have a prior or preferential right to
moneys in the hands of the public corporation to be used in the construction
of the building under 17-1-2. Mountain
States Supplv Co. v. Nuttall-Allen Co.,
03 U. 3S4, 225 P. 811.

that regard, it was nevertheless held
that mechanic's lien would not attach to
house and land devoted to public use,
such as a schoolhouse. Board of Education of Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake
Pressed Brick Co., 13 U. 211, 222, 44 P.
709, 20 A. L. R. 32G, 335.
3.

Bond as substitute for lien.
Notwithstanding materialmen and laborers are without right to file lien
against public building, and there is no
statute expressly requiring trustees of
state college to take bond from contractor to secure payment of material
and labor furnished contractors, if bond
is given to secure such payments, persons who perform labor or furnish material may enforce security. Smith v.
Bowman. *32 U. 33, 88 P. 087, 9 L. R.
A. (N. S.) 889.

2.

School buildings.
Although Session Laws of 1890, p. 24,
apparently contained no provision in

52-1-2. Contractors and Subcontractors Defined.
Whoever shall do work or furnish materials by contract, express or
implied, with the owner, as in this chapter provided, shall be deemed an
original contractor, and all other persons doing work or furnishing materials shall be deemed subcontractors.
(C. L. 17, § 3733.)
History.
This was section 3815 of 2 Comp. Laws
1888, Ch. 1. The present section is
identical with R. S. 1898, § 1383; Comp.
Laws 1907, § 1383.
Comparable provisions.
Iowa Code 1939. § 10270, subd. 2 ("subcontractor" includes every person furnishing material or performing labor,
except those having contracts directly
with owner, his agent or trustee).
1. Applicability of section.
A contract of pledge is sufficient.
Kvans v. Jenx-n. 51 V. 1. H»S P. 7»>*J.
Decisions from other jurisdictions.
— Iowa.
It is only under contract with the
owner that a party can be allowed a

lien as an original contractor. Templin
v. Chicago, B. & P. Ry. Co., 73 Iowa
548, 35 N. W. 034.
Code 1924. § 10270 (Code 1939,
§ 10270) was not intended to be construed as a limitation of the word
"owner" as used in section 10271, relating to mechanics' liens. Schoeneman
Lumber Co. v. Davis, 200 Iowa 873, 205
N. W. 502.
Purchaser of real estate under instalment contract is "owner" within meaninjf
of Mechanic's Lion Law. Knapp v. Baldwin, 213 Iowa 24, 238 N. \V. 542.
Ordinarily to "furnish'' means to deliver or t<> supply, and in Mechanic's
Lien Law to deliver or supply for use in
making of improvement or erection of
building. A. E. Shorthill Co. v. Aetna
Indemnity Co. of Hartford, Conn.
(Iowa), 124 X. W. 013.
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A. L. K. notes.
Who is a " c o n t r a c t o r " within provisions of Lien Law which limit liens for
material or labor furnished to c o n t r a c t o r

52-1-3

to amount earned hut unpaid on c o n t r a c t ,
or give such liens bv s u b r o g a t i o n , 83 A.
L. R. 1152.

;,2-l-3.

Who Entitled—Attaches to Owner's Interest—Lien on Ores
Mined.
Contractors, subcontractors and all persons performing labor upon,
or furnishing materials to be used in, the construction or alteration of,
or addition to, or repair of, any building, structure or improvement
upon land; all foundry men and boiler makers; all persons performing
labor or furnishing materials for the construction, repairing or carrying on of any mill, manufactory or hoisting works; all persons who shall
do work or furnish materials for the prospecting, development, preservation or working of any mining claim, mine, quarry, oil or gas well, or
deposit; and licensed architects and engineers and artisans who have
furnished designs, plats, plans, maps, specifications, drawings, estimates of cost, surveys or superintendence, or who have rendered other
like professional service, or bestowed labor, shall have a lien upon the
property upon or concerning which they have rendered service, performed labor or furnished materials, for the value of the service
rendered, labor performed or materials furnished by each respectively,
whether at the instance of the owner or of any other person acting by
his authority as agent, contractor or otherwise. Such liens shall attach
only to such interest as the owner may have in the property, but the
interest of a lessee of a mining claim, mine or deposit, whether working
under bond or otherwise, shall for the purposes of this chapter include
products mined and excavated while the same remain upon the premises included within the lease.
(C. L. 17, §§ 286, 3722, 3731, 3732, 3747.)
History.
This section was originally t a k e n from
Colorado, and in m a n y respects resembles
the e n a c t m e n t of t h a t s t a t e .
See 3
Colorado S t a t s . Ann., Ch. 101, 5 1 5 .
The p r e s e n t section is, in m a n y r e spects, identical with R. S. 1898. § 1372.
:»»d with Comp. L a w s 1907, § 1372. It
was formerly section 380G of 2 Comp.
Laws 1888, Ch. 1.
F o r m e r l y t h e liens of t h e principal conti'actor a n d t h e s u b c o n t r a c t o r
were
s
•< p a r a t e l y provided for.
Morrison v.
Carey-Lombard Co., 9 U. 70, 33 P. 238.
Comparable provisions.
Cal. Civil Proc. Code, § 1183 (lien
ronforred for performing' labor upon or
bestowing skill or other necessary serv'«'<•*, or furnishing m a t e r i a l s or appliances contributing to construction, al!
* lotion, addition to or repair of building,
improvement of land, and other desig?,
aUd objects and p r o j e c t ? ) .
Idaho Code, $ 44-501 (every person
P ' i f o r m i n g labor on. or furnishing m a ' • ' i n l s for construction, a l t e r a t i o n or
' i p a i r of mining claim, building, s t r u c -

t u r e and other designated objects and
projects has lien t h e r e o n ) .
Iowa Code 193!), § 10271 (every person
who furnishes m a t e r i a l or p e r f o r m s labor on building, construction, r e p a i r , or
i m p r o v e m e n t has lien on building and
land).
Mont. Rev. Codes, § 8339 (lien conferred for work or labor done, or m a terial, m a c h i n e r y or fixtures furnished,
in connection with a n y building, s t r u c t u r e , i m p r o v e m e n t and o t h e r designated
objects and p r o j e c t s ) .
Cross-references.
Bond to p r o t e c t mechanics and mat e r i a l m e n under p r i v a t e c o n t r a c t s , 17-2.
1.

Words and phrases defined.

2.

—"owner."

One in possession of land under a contract of purchase is an " o w n e r " within
m e a n i n g of this section. Carv-Lombard
Lumber Co. v. P a r t r i d g e , 10 U. 322, 37
1\ 572.
One having an equitable i n t e r e s t in t h e
premises is an owner within the m e a n i n g
of this section, hut such lien m a v also

Title 52—Liens
j • foi material *pt.c.ally fabricated
fi.r and adapted :•• building, but
r.,t used therein. ' ; A. L. R. 320.
I • f».r -services of p r i»»n supervising
, <>n»truction of building, architect,
, t .. no A. L. Pw. 1257.
\j •, • ..1 or labor emrl- ytd in construci iii of concrete f-.-nns as basis of
. n or claim ur. k r contractors'
d. 84 A. L. R. 4^0.
V
.: icV or materialman's lien on
}., mestcad, 65 A. L. R. 1192.
twr i '•* right to deduction on account
. f damages sustained through cont a c t o r ' s delay, 37 A. L. R. 7GG.
u • . i'- right to r e c c w r from confactor or surety on his bond
.miount paid or agreed to be paid
».y former to third person, in order
f.» avoid mechanics' liens for labor
. • material furni-hvd to contractor,
1 I A. L. R. 314.
|\.v i «d* court to authorize or direct
h n i v i T (or trustet in bankruptcy)
!•• -ell property free from liens, 35
\ L. R. 255, 78 A. L. R. 458.
I'» . voting indebtedness of contractor
to <»\vner as affecting right of subc «-!iti actor, materialman, or laborer
i.. hen, G8 A. L. R. 1202.
T \ . to pay lien a« embracing promi- to pay debt, 10 A. L. R. 81)1.
r . v Miib of statutes to secure payit : t for work or L.bor as includ:!j u^e of labor*, i '* own team.
. :»'mobile, or otlur equipment, 71
\. I,. R. 1130.
I.
> of contractor's lien as affectM'ur subcontractor's li^-n. G9 A. L.
\l. 1205.

52-1-4

Removal or demolition of building or
other structure as basis for mechanic's lien, 03 A. L. R. 1250.
Requirement of written contract as condition of mechanic's lien as affected
by an oral modification, or a modification partly oral and partly
written, of a written contract, or
a subsequent modification in writing not registered or filed as required by statute, 108 A. L. R. 434.
Right of one other than contractor,
laborer, or materialman to file lien,
83 A. L. R. 11.
Right of one who pays or advances
money, or assumes obligation to
pay laborer or materialman, to lien
or priority, 74 A. L. R. 522.
Right of subcontractor or materialman
to mechanic's lien for labor or material entering into work rejected
as not in compliance with principal contract, 1G A. L. R. 981.
Right to benefit of mechanic's lien statute for labor or material furnished
to contractor or subcontractor, as
affected by acceptance from him
of written obligation, 66 A. L. R.
342.
Right to lien against fee for work or
material furnished under contract
with life tenant, 97 A. L. R. 870.
Termination of lease as affecting lien
on buildings erected by tenant
where lien did not attach to landlord's title, 87 A. L. R. 1290.
Validity and effect of provision in contract against mechanic's lien, 102
A. L. R. 35G.

."•2-1-1. Amount of Land Affected—Lots and Subdivisions—Mines—
Franchises. Fixtures and Appurtenances.
Tht» liens granted by this chapter shall extend to and cover so much
•d lin» land whereon such building, structure or improvement shall be
"k<i«' as may be necessary for the convenient use and occupation
tliuvni", and in case any such building shall occupy two or more lots
»' »• <>tluT subdivisions of land, such lots or subdivisions shall be deemed
0,
|<' for the purposes of this chapter; and when two or more mining
* li.im^. mines or valuable deposits, whether owned by the same person
°i' not. shall, with the consent of all, be worked through a common shaft,
t:
iniud. incline, drift or other excavation, then all the mining claims,
inline or valuable deposits so worked shall for the purposes of this
•'.'ipter be deemed or,v_: and the liens in this chapter provided for shall
••'••i»-h to all franchise-, privileges, appurtenances, and to all machinery
•''' iKturcs, pertaini:*.£.r to or used in connection with any such lands,
'•'•l.iji!^, structures or improvements, mining claims, mines or valuable
!
i»-iK
(C. L. 17, §§ 3727, 3729, 3731.)
HMon.

''
^ i Hon to a cor.s. it-raule extent
'•'mtu-al with R. S. 1S98, §1379;
*'•»». Laws 1907, § 1379.
It was

originally derived from Colorado, and
hears a marked similarity thereto. Sec
3 Colorado Stats. Ann., Ch. 101, £ 17.

IV,. J

Title 52—Liens

52-1-5

:>2-i—">• Priority—Over Other Encumbrances.
'The liens herein provided for shall relate back to, and take effect as
,,!', the time of the commencement to do w o r k e r furnish materials on
tin- ground tor the structure or improvement/and shall have priority
OUT Any lfen, mortgage or other encumbrance which may have atKirhcd subsequently to the time when the building, improvement or
.tincture was commenced, work begun, or first material furnished on
tin- ground; also over any lien, mortgage or other encumbrance of
which the lien holder had no notice and which was unrecorded at the
time the building, structure or improvement was commenced, work
hrirun, or first material furnished on the ground.
(C. L. 17, §§3734, 3735.)
History.

This section w a s derived from the
i i ratio Statutes, and is in many re•...:> similar thereto. See 3 Colorado
.*:.-.! . Ann., Ch. 101, § 2 0 .
I ip\ section is, in most respects, similar to \l. S. 1808, § 1 3 8 5 ; Comp. Laws
I'M-;, § 1385. It was section 3810 of 2
»'..-i;|). Laws 1888, Ch. 1, and was section
I ,.f Session Laws of 1890, Ch. 30, p. 29.
>-.-.• Morrison v. Carey-Lombard Co., 9 U.
..'. T'.t. 33 P. 238.
torn parable provisions.
« .!. Civil Proc. Code, § 118G, Idaho
« •?••. c 1-1—50<> (substantially the same,
• •'•:•> ihat the "relate back" clause is
1

: «•«!».

• C >de 1'.'39, $10287 (mechanics'
. . are preferred to all other liens ex••«!•. -'.ch as contractor or subcontractor
i i actual or constructive notice of be' .» commencement of work or l'urnish•••••- ol' material).
M »;;. Rev. Codes, §8344 (liens attach
•' i'reference to any prior lien, encum:u e or m o r t g a g e ) .
1

Operation and effect of section.
J In- section places all mechanics' liens
•
at- <lass not only without priority
•''•"•.u themselves, but also that rights
!
• .il of* the liens of same class attach
". ihe date when the first lien of such
• ••» attached. United States Building
A
Lo:i:: Ass'n v. Midvale Home Finance
1
"'!>.. 86 U. 506, 44 P.2d 1090, rehearing
|4
• !V«-d 86 U. 522, 46 P.2d 672.
1
his section requires other lienholders,
•mortgage or otherwise, to take notice
Hie commencement of work on the
; !:
-n«.v. Teahen v. Nelson, 6 U. 363, 23

'' ',«•.!.
1

»£«muncement and duration of lien.
' -••£tjon expressly provides that all
'•• !".is^shall attach at the time the
'ii!:.!i;'0 of the contract commences;
' '!i;v.!-lv. claimant's lien attaches o.n
'j'«/tato he commences to do the work or
- i j j m i i s h the material, and is not post!

poned to the date of filing- thp nntirP fqr
record as provided in 52-1-7. Morrison
v. Carev-Lombard Co., 9 U. 70, 33 P.
238.
Mechanic's lien takes effect as of date
of commencement of work and furnishing
of materials, and is prior to intervening
equities. Sanford v. Kunkel, 30 U. 379,
85 P. 363.
When labor and materials are furnished to one not an owner, lien attaches
to title instant title vests in owner so
contracting for labor and materials furnished before he became the owner.
United States Building & Loan Ass'n v.
Midvale Home Finance Corp., 86 U. 506,
44 P.2d 1090, rehearing denied 86 U. 522,
46 P.2d 672.
Under former statute, held that lien
of subcontractor attached on date of subcontractor's commencing to do work or
to furnish materials. Morrison v. InterMountain Salt Co., 14 U. 201, 46 P. 1104,
following Morrison v. Carev-Lombard
Co.,
9 U. 70, 33 P. 238.
3.
1.

Priorities.
— o v e r other liens and claims.
Lien for all of materials, furnished by
single lien claimant, en continuous, open,
running account, for purpose of developing and operating mine, held prior to
trust deed executed by mining company,
and recorded, between times when materials were first and last furnished.
Fields v. Daisv Gold Min. Co., 25 U. 76,
69 P. 528 (Baskin, J., dissenting); Salt
Lake Hardware Co. v. Fields, 69 P. 1134,
not officially reported (Baskin, J., dissenting) .
A deed of trust upon a canal to be COHstnictrrf cannot take precedence over a
mechanic's l«en for work done and materials furnished in building the canal,
even though trust deed antedates the
doing of the work or furnishing the
materials. Canal was not in existence
until constructed. Garland v. Dear Lake
<fc River Waterworks & Irrigation Co., 9
U. 350, 362, 34 P. 368, aff'd 164 U. S. 1,
41 L. Ed. 327, 17 S. Ct. 7.

